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The Imprint of Foucault’s The Order of Things on the Works of François Jacob 
by Harry Newcomb 
 
My intent is to examine the interplay between Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things1, 
originally published in France as Les Mots et les choses (Words and Things) in 1966, François 
Jacob’s history of heredity, The Logic of Life 2 , published in France in 1970, and his 
autobiography, The Statue Within3, 1987. I deploy block quotes throughout not only on account 
of Foucault’s verbosity, but also to provide context from the quoted works that shorter quotes 
would not provide. 
To begin, The Order of Things. With this book, Foucault takes it upon himself to write a 
history of the modern sciences that looks beyond the typical progressive narrative.  
I am not concerned, therefore, to describe the progress of knowledge 
towards an objectivity in which today’s science can finally be recognized; 
what I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the 
episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having 
reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its 
positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing 
perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, 
what should appear are those configurations within the space of 
knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. 
2 François, Jacob. The Logic of Life. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. 
3 François, Jacob. The Statue Within. New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 1995. 
	   2	  
Such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of 
that word, as an ‘archaeology’. 
Now, this archaeological inquiry has revealed two great discontinuities in 
the episteme of Western culture: the first inaugurates the Classical age 
(roughly halfway through the seventeenth century) and the second, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, marks the beginning of the modern 
age. (xxii) 
There are the two major points of The Order of Things: one, that there exists, under the 
surfaces of knowledge, under the opinions and ideas of individuals, a set of rules that, by 
ordering the world, entirely determines the possibilities of knowledge and bestows upon 
knowledge a regularity across intellectual fields traditionally considered immiscible. And two, 
that this set of rules, this episteme, is discontinuous in time; that is, now and again, it will 
abruptly become an entirely different order. There may be the appearance of continuity across 
time at the superficial level of ideas, but it is illusory. Ideas owe their existence to a certain 
epistemological framework and, when it disappears so too do the ideas, to be replaced by new 
ones which, though seemingly similar, rely on an utterly different conception of the world in 
their construction. 
As a consequence of Foucault’s method, the influence of individuals in the movement of 
knowledge becomes vanishingly small: 
I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific 
discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their 
perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that 
dominate and even overwhelm them. In short, I tried to explore scientific 
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discourse not from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking, 
nor from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are saying, 
but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very 
existence of such discourse... (xiv) 
In other words, the episteme makes possible the individuals who elaborate its possibilities, 
not the other way around. The individual, therefore, vanishes from the discussion. On the one 
hand you have the episteme and on the other you have what is considered knowledge under that 
episteme, and since the latter is necessarily determined by the former, there is no need to 
introduce any such intermediary as the scientist. 
What we see in The Logic of Life, François Jacob’s history of heredity and reproduction, 
is the adoption of Foucault’s ideas, but couched in language that will later be reiterated in The 
Statue Within (and with a major exception that I will come to later): 
For a biologist, there are two different ways of examining the history of 
his science. Firstly, it may be considered as a succession of ideas, thus 
involving a search for the thread which guided thought along the path to 
current theories. This is reverse history, so to speak, which moves back 
from the present towards the past. Step by step, the forerunner of the 
current hypothesis is chose, then the forerunner of the forerunner, and so 
on. (10) 
 
The alternative approach to the history of biology involves the attempt to 
discover how objects become accessible to investigation thus permitting 
new fields of science to be developed. It requires analysis of the nature of 
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these objects, and of the attitude of the investigators, their methods of 
observation, and the obstacles raised by their cultural background. … 
There is no longer a more or less linear sequence of ideas, each produced 
from its predecessor, but instead a domain which thought strives to 
explore, where it seeks to establish order and attempts to construct a world 
of abstract relationships in harmony not only with observations and 
techniques, but also with current practices, values and interpretations. … 
Here knowledge works on two levels. Each period is characterized by a 
range of possibilities defined not only by current theories or beliefs, but 
also by the very nature of the objects accessible to investigation, the 
equipment available for studying them and the way of observing and 
discussing them. It is only within this range that reason can manoeuvre. 
(11) 
 
This way of considering the evolution of a science such as biology is 
completely different from the preceding one. There is no longer any 
question of finding the royal road of ideas, retracing the confident march 
of progress towards what now appears to be a solution, using present-day 
rational values to interpret the past and examine it for pointers to the 
present. On the contrary, it means specifying the various stages of 
knowledge, defining the transformations and revealing the conditions 
which enable objects and interpretations to enter the field of the possible. 
(12) 
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As might be expected, Jacob adopts the latter method in The Logic of Life. In that method 
are the features of The Order of Things, the episteme and its discontinuity, and the quasi-
continuous surfaces, but rephrased slightly so that we can recognize in them the features of what 
Jacob will call in The Statue Within “day science”: progressive, martial, and certain; and “night 
science”, with its incertitude and desultoriness. 
And, as in Foucault, the significance of the individual shrivels: “The importance of the 
individual decreases as the number of practitioners increases: if an observation is not made here 
today, it will most frequently be made somewhere else tomorrow.” (11) 
In The Statue Within, two adjacent passages serve to illuminate the influence of Foucault 
on Jacob: “I see my life less as a continuity than as a series of different selves—I might almost 
say, strangers.” – the little boy, the adolescent, the medical student, the fighting man, the wreck, 
the beginner at the Pasteur institute – “All this gang marching in single file.” (15) And then: 
Recovering each of my past selves takes time and effort. I must 
concentrate, prepare myself, rather like setting out to visit old long-
neglected friends. Or, rather, like planning a trip to foreign countries one 
has not returned to for years. Upon arriving in each country, one has to 
relearn the geography, the customs, the manners. Each time, one has to 
devote oneself to the unrelenting observation of existence, in a different 
texture of space and time. Each time, one must relinquish the habits of the 
last country before acquiring the habits of the new. Each time one must 
relearn a particular milieu, particular faces, a particular language. (16) 
There, in The Statue Within, is visible the influence of Foucault, in a sequence of 
discontinuous and foreign figures, each with its own perspective and habits. There, too, is that 
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second method of history, now made personal. And, in a way, the subject, the individual, is 
missing. Instead of a single, solitary self, a big “I”, we are presented with fragments. There is, 
however, a certain unity in The Logic of Life and The Statue Within, and this is where Jacob 
diverges from Foucault. 
The Order of Things ends with the image of “man”, the object of the human sciences and 
a notion which only became epistemologically possible at the beginning of the 19th century, as “a 
face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea,” (387) an image that emphasizes the transience and 
impermanence of the objects of knowledge. It is a conclusive image; a period ending one era and 
initiating another, with no exchange at the threshold, no play of meaning across chapters. As it 
has been phrased, by analogy with Nietzsche, man is dead. There is no ellipsis. For Foucault, the 
objects of knowledge disappear completely because the specific construction of knowledge that 
allows for them to exist changes, with a saltation, to something completely different, replacing 
the former wholesale and never allowing for old modes of thought to be revisited. 
Jacob, whose constant agonizing over annihilation and mortality is a continuous presence 
in The Statue Within, suggests an alternative in that text and in The Logic of Life. We know that 
for Jacob former selves never disappear, but reassert themselves at times, revived by familiar 
sensations and situations. They must be, in some way, in some part, maintained: 
And then, how not to see that all these selves of my past life have played 
the greatest role, and the greater the earlier they came, in the development 
of the secret image that from the deepest part of me guides my tastes, 
desire, decisions. Starting in the younger years, imagination seizes on the 
people and things it encounters. It grinds them down, transforms them, 
abstracts a feature or a sign with which to shape our ideal representation of 
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the world. A schema that becomes our system of reference, our code to 
decipher oncoming reality. Thus, I carry within a kind of inner statue, a 
statue sculpted since childhood, that gives my life a continuity and is the 
most intimate part of me, the hardest kernel of my character. I have been 
shaping this statue all my life. I have been constantly retouching, polishing, 
refining it. … Thus, I harbor not just one ideal person with whom I 
continually compare myself. I carry a whole train of moral figures, with 
utterly contradictory qualities, who in my imagination are always ready to 
act as my fellow players in situations and dialogues imprinted in my head 
since childhood or adolescence. For every role in this repertory of the 
possible, for all the activities that surround me and involve me directly, I 
thus hold actors ready to respond to cues in comedies and tragedies 
inscribed in me long ago. Not a gesture, not a word, but has been imposed 
by the statue within. (Statue, 18-19) 
There, like in Foucault, the surface possibilities are determined by something deeper. But, 
where Foucault has in that place an order that changes only by dissolving completely and being 
replaced, Jacob postulates a substrate on which each new self leaves an imprint, a figurative 
statue which allows for continuity and continuation.  
In The Logic of Life, too, a unity. Near the end of The Logic of Life, Jacob declares: 
“There is a coherence in the descriptions of science, a unity in its explanations, that reflects an 
underlying unity in the entities and principles involved. Whatever their level, the objects of 
analysis are always organizations, systems.” (323) Earlier in the book, he says:  
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There is not one single organization of the living, but a series of organizations 
fitted into one another like nests of boxes or Russian dolls. Within each, another is 
hidden. Beyond each structure accessible to investigation another structure of a 
higher order is revealed, integrating the first and giving it its properties. The 
second can only be reached by upsetting the first, by decomposing the organism 
and recomposing it according to other new laws. Each level of organization thus 
brought to light leads to a new way of considering the formation of living 
beings. … 
The discovery of each ‘Russian doll’, the demonstration of these consecutive 
levels are not the result of a mere accumulation of observations and experiments. 
More often they express a deeper change, a new way of considering objects, a 
transformation in the very nature of knowledge. (16-17) 
These passages reflect the same outlook as The Statue Within. Earlier and exterior dolls 
open onto different (and in this case smaller and finer) dolls, which nonetheless share the general 
shape of all the larger dolls. In the sciences, each rosy-cheeked devotchka hides another just like 
it. 
Taken all together, we find in Jacob’s works the Foucauldian idea of discontinuity, at a 
historical and personal level, but also a purely Jacobian internal essence which is changed and 
imprinted by each discontinuous era, while maintaining the stamp of all things prior. The 
structural similarities between the historical in The Logic of Life and the personal in The Statue 
Within suggest that we can pull the two together; that, as much as the present Jacob stands at the 
end of line of selves, he also stands at the end of a line of historical figures, both asserting an 
influence on his life through their imprint on his internal statue. The scientist, the wreck, the 
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student, the soldier, the adolescent, and the little boy stand with this girl of twenty, the father, the 
grandfather, all the males in the family who so obligingly tell their war stories, la générale, 
Foucault, the individuals we term Galton, Darwin, Bernard, Humboldt, Cuvier, Buffon, Linnaeus; 
and, even further back, Roman ladies and Greek goddesses, Cleopatra and Socrates. The long 
dead are brought to bear on the present; they live on. 
It is with this mechanism that Jacob denies finitude. Each momentary self adds to the 
statue within. Therefore, by renewing himself, changing fixed ideas, reaching for his little lights, 
becoming someone new, Jacob adds more of himself onto the end of that long line that his 
descendants, genetic and intellectual, will inherit. In that way, so long as he keeps changing, he 
resists oblivion. 
 
